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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
ROBERT "BUDDY" WASHINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 12088

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The Defendant-Appellant was charged with
two crimes, to-wit; receiving stolen property
having a value in excess of Fifty Dollars
($50.00) in violation of Section 76-38-12 U.C.A.
1953, as amended, and being an habitual
criminal in violation of Section 76-1-18, U.C.A.
1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court, by jury verdict, found
the Defendant-Appellant guilty on both charges
and Defendant-Appellant was sentenced by the
Honorable Dallas H. Young to a term in the Utah
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-2State Prison not to exceed five years on the
charge of receiving stolen goods, and the
further term of not less than fifteen years
on the charge of being an habitual criminal
said terms to be served concurrently.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a directed verdict of
not guilty as a matter of law on both charges
or alternatively, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The facts upon which the State relies to
establish the crimes, as alleged, are as follows:
A series of burglaries·were perpetrated
in or about the City of Ogden, State of Utah
during the months of August, September, and
October, 1969. (T. 4, 10, 15, 23, 32) •
Certain articles were taken in the burglaries
which were admitted into evidence as state's
Exhibits "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "G", "H" and
"I " • (T • 9 6) •

Officers Balls and Buzick testified that
they recovered the State's Exhibits nA n, nB n,
ncn TTDTT !TETI TTGTT TTJ-ITT and nrll from the pre' located
'
' at 122
' Doxey and 118 Doxey, Ogden,
mises
Utah. (T. 87, 94). These premises are the
resisences of Shirley Owens a/k/a Shirley
Gallegos, Lester and Faye Hall, and James
McClellan. (T. 62, 40, 83). The Appellant
resides at 2?71 Lincoln, Ogden, Utah. (T. 114) •
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Howard Wade testified for and on behalf
of the state that he is the owner of Exhibit
"A" consi~
. t ing
.
o f a Po1 aroid Camera, (T. 4, 5)
and that it was removed from his residence on
or about September 25, 1969. (T. 4). Mr. Wade
testified that the value of Exhibit "A 11 , when
new was $225.00 (T. 9), while admitting the
camera was two.and one-half years old. (T. 9)
C. W. Hartman testified that he owned
Exhibit 11 B11 , a black persian lamb jacket~
(T. 11). Mr. Hartman's testimony as to value
was $550.00, but was based solely on replacement value and not current market value of
Exhibit 11 B11 •
(T. 13) • Mrs. Faye Hall received
this coat from Shirely Owens and the Appellant
was never involved with it. (T. 59).
Exhibit "C", a black and white Dumont
Television set, was taken from the premises
of Dale Iverson. (T. 16). Appellant has never
had possession of this television. Shirley
Owens moved it to a neighbor's house. (T. 69,
70). It was found at 118 Doxey, the residences
of James McClellan (T. 45, 56, 93) by Officer
Balls.
Virginia M. Chase, a witness for the
state claimed ownership of Exhibits "D" and
'
• an d a
"E 11 , consisting
of a Westinghouse Radio
pendant watch (T. 23, 26). The value of the
.
radio was established at $7.97 (T. 28), however identification was not clearly established
inasmuch as an invoice, Exhibit "F", recited
a serial nwnber, RD11D28A, but no evidence was
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elicited to show whether Exhibit 11 D" had a
corresponding serial number. (T. 24). No
value was ever established for Exhibit "E".
(T. 26) . Exhibit nEu, the pendant watch
was given to Mrs. Faye Hall by Shirley '
Owens. (T. 55) •
Muriel Hardy testified that Exhibit
uG u , an an t.ique gun, b elonged to her. (T. 32).
Sentimental value of $50.00 was placed on
Exhibit uG" by Mrs. Hardy.; (T. 37, 38).
Exhibit "Gu was positively identified as not
being one of the guns the Appellant sold to
Lester Hall. (T. 45). Exhibit uH", a hairdryer, was also identified by Mrs. Hardy as
part of some articles taken from the Hardy
residence. (T. 33). However, her only means
of identification was its standard container.
(T. 36, 37). No present market value ·was
ever introduced into evidence of the hairdryer, but only the recitation of the price
tag attached thereto. (T. 35) while an
admission was made that the hairdryer was
two years old. (T. 33).
Exhibit "Iu, a Silvertone Color Television
was identified by Mrs. Hardy as belonging to
her. (T. 34, 35). However, this testimony
was in conflict with her testimony at the preliminary Hearing wherein she stated she could
not identify the television as being hers.
(T. 38). Mr. Lester Hall testified he did not
know how this color television got into his
home. (T. 49, 50). Mrs. Faye Hall, wife of
Lester Hall testified that she and another

.'
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friend brought the color television over
to the Hall residence, and that Appellant
did not bring the television to the Halls.
(T. 56). Once again the only valuation of
"I" was the purchase price of
Ex h 1·b·t
1
$400.00 and not the present market value
of this two year old set (T. 34).
Officer B~lls made a promise to the
Halls, McClellan, and Shirley Owens that
if they would cooperate that no complaint
would be filed.
(T. 99). Officer Balls
stated that he knew the amount that was
paid for the various items, to-wit; $12.00
for the Polaroid camera and $30.00 for the
color T.V., but that _this was not sufficient,
in his opinion, to establish .a possible
charge of possession of stolen goods. (T. 10~).
Appellant took the stand in his own
behalf and testified that he was attempting
to sell the goods· for a friend. ·(T. 115) •
Corroboration of this testimony came from
Holly Steele. (T. 108). On cross-examination
of the Appellant, the state was allowed,
over timely objection, to inquire concerning
some credit cards. (T. 126, 127).
The credit cards were admitted, over
Appellant's objection, for the sole purpose
of impeachment. (T. 131). The State attempted
to introduce proposed Exhibits "M", "N" and
"O", and Appellant again made timely
objection which was sustained, even though the
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State urged admission for purposes of impeachment only. (T. 13 6) .
The case was then submitted to the jury
on the charge of possession of stolen goods
in excess of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) and the
jury received their instruction. (T. 138).
Counsel for Appellant took exception to the
Court's refusal to give proposed instructions
relating to testimony of accomplices and the
need for corroborating evidence and the
failure to instruct on a lesser included
charge. (T. 138, 139, 140). The jury found
the Appellant guilty of the charge of possession
of stolen property having a value in excess of
Fifty Dollars ($50.00).
The trial was then continued on the second
charge, to-wit; that Appellant is in the status
of an habitual criminal in violation of
Section 76-1-18, U.C.A., 1953, as amended.
(T. 141). The State produced James W. Johnson,
its only witness, who is the records _and
identification officer at the Utah State
Prison. (T. 143). Certain copies of records
were brought to the Court by Mr. Johnson.
(T. 144). State Exhibits 1 and 2, which were·
admitted over Appellant's objection, consist
of unverified copies of alleged corrunitments
from Salt Lake County District Courts.
(T. 151, 152, 153). State's Exhibits 1, 2, 3
and 4 were all admitted over Appellant's
objection. The jury was then instructed.
(T. 157). The counsel for Appellant excepted
to instruct~on number 7. (T. 157).
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The jury entered a verdict of guilty
and the Court set time for sentencing.
(T. 157, 158). Appellant was sentenced to
a term of not more than five years and to
a term of not less than fifteen years in
the Utah State Prison (R. 27).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
STATE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW TO SUSTAIN
APPELLANTrs CONVICTION AND THE
TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT GRANTING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT.
At the conclusion of the State's evidence,
counsel for Appellant made a timely and appropriate motion for dismissal and alternatively for
a directed verdict based upon Section 77-31-18
u.c.A., 1953, as amended, which states: ·
nconviction on testimony of
accomplice. A conviction shall
not be had on the testimony of
an accomplice, unless he is
corroborated by other evidence,
which in itself and without the
aid of the testimony of the
accomplice tends to connect the
defendant with the commission
of the offense; and the corroboration shall not be sufficient,
if it merely shows the commission
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of the offense or the circwnstances thereof.TT
Examination of the witnesses and the
evidence against Appellant is in three
categories, to-wit; the victims, the retrievers
and the accomplices. The state's witnesses
Howard Wade, C. W. Hartman, Dale Iverson
Virginia M. Chase and Muriel Hardy repre~ent
the first class called the victims. All of
these witnesses, without exception, testified
that they were the owners of certain properties
consisting of Exhibits TIA TT !TB" TTcn !TD" "En
'
'
'
nGn, nHn and TTI", and that ' these' .properties
were removed from the respective owner by a
person or persons unknown. None had ever known
the Appellant nor had any of these witnesses
ever observed the Appellant in possession of
their properties.
The second category of witnesses, the
retrievers, consist· of officers Murlin Balls,
Charles Buzick, and Mr. James McClellan. The
substance of the testimony of these three
witnesses consist of recovery of the properties
identified as Exhibits TIA TT' TTB Tl' TTCTT' TIDTI' TIETT'
TTG TT' TTHTI and TTI TT from the premises of Lester
Hall, Shirley Owens, a/k/a Shirle~ Gallegos and
James McClellen. None of these witnesses
observed any of the subject properties in the
possession of the Appellant.
The third category of the state's witnesses
the accomplices, consist of Lest:r Hall, Faye
Hall and Shirely Owens, a/k/a Shirley Gallegos.
All of these witnesses were granted immunity o.f
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prosecution by Officer Balls if they cooperated.
(T. 99). The law is very clear in Utah in
defining an accomplice. In State v. Fertig,
120 Utah 224, 233 P2d 347, 348 this Court
stated, quoting from an earlier case, State v.
Bowman, 92 Utah 540, 70 P2d 458, 461:
"In this. State we have no statutory
definition of an accomplice, but
the court has construed the word to
refer to one who is or could be .,
charged as a principal with the
defendant on trial."
It is true that Officer Balls testified
that in his opinion there was not enough
reason to suspect that Lester Hall, Faye Hall
and Shirley Owens might be guilty of possession
of stolen property (T. 102, 103, 104). However
Officer Balls did know the property was recently
stolen. (T. 104). He knew that the Halls had
paid $12. 00 for Exhibit "A", the Polaroid
Camera and $30.00 for Exhibit "!", the color
television, and received as gifts.Exhibits "B"
and "E", the coat and watch respectively.
Shirley Owens did not have any explanation as·
to the possession of Exhibits "C", "G" and
"H" the black and white television, the gun
and ' the hairdryer respectively. State v.
Bruner, 106 Utah 49, 145 P2d 302, 304 it states:
"Even if they had not told
Appellant that these goods had
been stolen, the fact that they
concealed them on a city dump
over two miles away would
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indicate to any reasonable
person that they did so
because they did not want
the articles to be found in
their possession -- a circumstance which would at least
suggest that the•articles
were "hot".TT
Section 78-38-1, reads in part:
TT. . . Possession of property
recently stolen, when the
person in possession fails
to make a satisfactory
explanation, shall be deemed
prima facie evidence of guilt.TT
This same section was cited in State v. Vigil,
infra, as tending to show corroboration of the
crime of possession of stolen goods.
The Halls and Shirley Owens not only had
possession of goods known to be recently
stolen, but secreted both the black and white
television and the color television, Exhibits
"B" and "I" respectively, in a neighbor's
basement because they thought it might be
"hot".
Officer Ball's testimony in this respect
must be severely discounted and taken in
light of his promise not to file charges
against the accomplices, is not only suspicion,
but evidence which the Court has held as
sufficient t'o convict for the crime of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-11possession ·Of stolen goods.
Appellant is charged with violating
Section 76-38-12 U.C.A., 1953, as amended,
which states:
nReceiving stolen property.
--Every person who for his own
gain or"to prevent the owner
from again possessing his property, buys or receives any
personal property exceeding
$50.00 in value, knowing the
same to have been stolen, is
punishable by imprisonment in
the state prison not exceeding
five years, .
TT
Lester Hall purchased from the Appellant what
has been identified as state's Exhibits nAn
and nr TT.
(T. 44) . Mrs. Faye Hall testified
she purchased Exhibit TTin from the Appellant.
(T 56). Mrs. Hall further stated that she
received the watch, Exhibit nEn and the black
fur coat, Exhibit TTcn from Shirley Owens,
(T. 55, 59) and that the Appellant brought
the radio, Exhibit nun and left it with the
Halls. (T. 55, 57). Shirley Owens, a/k/a
Shirley Gallegos testified that she kept the
hairdryer, Exhibit TTHTT (T. 69) and that she
had Exhibit nGn, the rifle in her possession
when it was recovered by the police. (T. 67).
Shirley Owens further testified that she
moved the black and white television, Exhibit
TTB" next door to Mr. McClellan's residence.
(T. 77) •
0
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-12The foregoing acts of purchase and/or
possession of the very property in question
makes Lester Hall, Faye Hall and Shirley
Owens, a/k/a Shirley Gallegos accomplices.
They could have been charged with the
identical crime as the Appellant.
There is no evidence other than that of
these three witnesses, who were accomplices,
to show the crime with which Appellant has
been charged. The state clearly proved the
possession by the three accomplices, but not
as to the Appellant. This falls under the
purview of State v. Vigil, 123 Utah, 495,
260 P2d, 539, 541 wherein the court stated:
nHowever, the corroborating
evidenc~ must connect the
Defendant with the commission
of the offense ... n (citations
omitted)
The offense is having possession. No evidence
existed at the time the state rested its case
and the motion made of the Appellant's
possession other than the accomplices' uncorroborated testimony. Therefore, as a matter
of law, Appellant was entitled to a directed
verdict inasmuch as Appellant could not, as a
matter of law, be convicted on uncorroborated
testimony of accomplices.
Appellant's motion for dismissal, based
on the State's failure to prove a prima facie
case, was a~propriate and the trial court
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-13erred in refusing to grant said motion.
Not only did the State fail to show any
corroborating evidence of the alleged crime,
but the State ·failed to establish any basis
for the valuation of Exhibits "A" "B" "C" ·
'
,
'
"D", "E", "G" and "I". The only valuation
on these items ~ame from the owners except
Exhibit "C", the black and white television
set which was valued by a repairman at l~.ss
than $25.00. (T. 21).
Exhibit "A'", the Polaroid Camera, was
valued by Howard Wade at $225.00. Mr. Wade
received Exhibit "A" as a gift, two and onehalf years ago and his valuation is the cost
of the camera when he received the gift.
(T. 8, 9). No present market valuation
exists. Exhibit "B", the black fur coat, was
valued by Mr.· C. W. Hartman at $550.00. This
valuation was based solely on replacement cost
and not present market value. (T. 12, 13).
Mr. Dale Iverson, at page 21 of the
transcript admitted that Exhibit "C" in its
present condition was valued at less than
$25.00. Exhibits "D" and "E", identified
by Virginia M. Chase, were valued at $7.97
for the radio, Exhibit "D", but no value was
even given for the watch, Exhibit "E".
(T. 28, 26) •

Mrs. Muriel Hardy identified Exhibits

"G".

"H" and "I", the gun, hairdryer and color T.V.

respectively~

Sentimental value of $50.00
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was placed on the gun, (T. 37, 38) however,
Mrs. Hardy admitted that the gun would not
sell for $50.00. The hairdryer apparently
had a price tag on it which reflected a
price of $23.79. Mrs. Hardy testified that
this is what she paid for the hairdryer
(T. 35), while admitting that the original
bonnet had been replaced with a different
color and that the hairdryer was at least
two years old. (T. 3 7, 3 3) . Exhibit npT,
the color television, was purchased from
Sears for $400.00. (T. 34). No evidence was
elicited or made of record which reflects
what the present market value of Exhibit urn
is, which was at least two years old (T. 34).
In net effect, no competent evidence
exists to show that the item or items had a
present market value in excess of $50.00.
The cost of an item, or the sentimental value
of an item, or the replacement value of an
item, or no value at all on an item is not
competent evidence to submit to a jury that
Exhibits TTATT, TTBTT, TTCTT, TTDTT, TIETT, TT(jTT and TTITT
had a present value in excess of $50.00 at
the time they were allegedly in the possession
of the Appellant. The state failed in establishing a prima facie case of the crime charged,
and as a matter of law Appellant's Motion to
Dismiss was proper and should have been granted.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LAW
APPLI"CAI3LE TO THE TESTIMONY OF AN
ACCOMPLICE AND THE REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT
ON A LESSER OFFENSE.
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-15Counsel for Appellant requested three
instructions which relate to the need for
corroborating evidence and that the Appellant
cannot be convicted upon the testimony of
accomplices only. (T. 139, 140) • ·Exception
was taken upon the Court's refusal to so
instruct the jury. In State v. Hall, 112
Utah 272, 186 ~~d 970 the Court recognized
the right of an accused to have the jury
instructed concerning testimony of accom.-::.
plices. In Hall, supra, however as well as
in State v. Scott, 22 Ut2d 27, 447 P2d 908,.
the trial counsel failed to request the
proper instructions. However, instructions.
were submitted in this instance and timely
exceptions taken to the Trial Court's
refusal to so instruct the jury.
Other jurisdictions, notably Arizona
and California, have held that it is
reversible error not to so instruct the jury.
even though no instructions were requested.
In State v. Owen, 3 Ariz. App. 509, ~15 P2d
907, 909 the Arizona Court states:
"No instruction was requested or
given to the jury pertaining to
the law applicable to the testimony of an accomplice • • •
failure to instruct the jury on
the· applicable principles of law
concerning the necessity for
corroboration of the testimony
of an accomplice, even though not
requested,. is reversible. error ••• "
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-16In People v. Wade, 169 C.A.2d 554, 337 P2d
502, 504 the California Court states:
"It does not appear from the
record that defendants offered
any instructions regarding accomplices. This does not relieve
the court of the duty to give
such instructions sue sponte,
even though the question is one
of fact for the jury. It is
incumbent upon the court to
instruct the jury fully upon the
law in a criminal case. This
rule includes instructions concerning the law pertaining to
accompl~ces and corroboration
when applicable." (citations
omitted)
The Trial Court's refusal in this instance,
when proper instructions are requested,
together with timely exceptions, constitute
reversible error.

I
I

The Trial Court further refused, although
initial indication was given that it would be
given, to instruct the jury about the lesser
offense of a misdemeanor if the jury found the
value was less than Fifty Dollars ($50.00).
The jury was in effect instructed that the
value was in excess of Fifty Dollars ($50.00).
This is a fact which must be found by the jury
and not the Court. In State v. Valdez, 19
.Ut2d 426, 4)2 P2d 53, 54 this Court stated:
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-17"As a general rule the trial
court should submit to the jury
included offenses where the
evidence would justify such a
verdict."
Contrary to the Valdez situation, Appellant's
trial counsel di9.request specifically an
instruction on the lesser offense. It is
prejudicial to the Appellant and reversible
error not to so instruct, since the failure·
to do so constitutes an affirmative instruction
to the jury that the value of the property in
question which Appellant allegedly had in his
possession exceeded Fifty Dollars ($50.00).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
EXHIBITS J, K, AND L, INTO EVIDENCE.
The Trial Court, over Appellant's timely
objection allowed into evidence Exhibits '~",
"K" and "L", consisting of three· credit cards;
(T. 131). The basic objection is to an
improper foundation as well as materiality.
(T. 126, 131, 135). There is no materiality
to the credit cards unless Appellant was
charged with an offense encompassing said
cards. It is true that the credit cards were
admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment~
(T. 131). However, the possession of them

does not impeach Appellant's testimony.

·Officer Richard E. Petersen's testimony

reflects the lack of foundation.

Officer
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-18Petersen at pages 134 through 136 of the
record discloses that certain items, among
which were Exhibits "J 1; "K" and "L", .were
given to him as being the Appellant's
personal effects. This is hearsay evidence
of the individual or individuals who
allegedly obtained these personal effects.
It was prejudicial to Appellant to have
before the jury, even for the limited purpose of impeachment (instruction No. 10) ,
where the jury is not instructed on impeachment, and where this so-called impeachment
evidence tends to implicate the Appellant to
the crime of burglary. The obvious prejudice
of this immaterial and hearsay evidence is not
overcome by the ·simple unexplained instruction.
It is, therefore, reversible error to admit
Exhibits "J" "K" and "L".

'

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING
STATE'S EXHIBITS l·and 2, AND THE
STATE FAILED IN THE BURDEN OF PROOF
TO ESTABLISH APPELLANT AS AN
HABITUAL CRIMINAL.
The state called James Johnson as its
only witness in an attempt to establis~ the
prior conviction, sentencings and commitments
pursuant to Section 76-1-18 U.C.A., 1953, as
emended. The Trial Court allow~d the introduction of, and receipt of Exhibits 1 and 2,
over the obj~ction of Appellant's counsel,
into evidence. (T. 150, 152, 153). These
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-19exhibits consist of alleged copies of documents purporting to be commitments of the
Appellant. (T. 144). Both of these alleged
copies of purported commitments are from the
Salt Lake County District Court. (T. 150,
152). The sole witness admits on page 152 of
the transcript:
••
"Question: And you don't know whether
or not this is a true and
accurate record of the
sentence and commitment of
Buddy Washington from the
..
Salt Lake County Court, do
·you?"
"Answer:

Well, I don't suppose that
I know any of them are true
and accurate as far as that
goes then."

Appellant's counsel objected and asserted
that the state should have some official record
from Salt Lake County Court and not copies from
the Utah State Prison files to establish any
alleged conviction, sentence and commitment.
(T. 153). The records offered and admitted by
the trial court were hearsay as to any alleged
conviction, sentence and/or commitment. Therefore, the State has failed in its burden of
proof on the issue of Appellant being in the
status of an habitual criminal.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING
APPELLANT TWICE FOR THE SINGLE
OFFENSE.
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-20Appellant was sentenced twice. First for
a term of not more than five years and again
for a term not less than fifteen years, both
to be served in the Utah State Prison, said
sentences to run concurrently. (R. 6). It
has been held on numerous occasions that being
an habitual criminal is not a substantive
crime but a status. The language found at
page 1000 of the Pacific Reporter in State v.
Wood, 2 Ut2d 34, 268 P2d 998 is decisive:
"This court has held that being
an habitual criminal is a status,
and to be ·charged with being an
habitual criminal is not to be
charged with a crime." (citations
omitted)
In the fairly recent case
14 Ut2d 232, 381 P2d 721,
the significance of being
criminal by the following

of Zeimer v. Turner,
723, the court states
charged. as an habitual
language:

·"Being an habitual criminal is a
status, and to be charged with
being an habitual criminal is not
to be charged with a crime. The
habitual criminal statute will
apply only upon a conviction of
the criminal offense last charged.
Its invocation does not inflict
additional or further punishment
for the prior convictions or
impose a new punishment therefor.
It only serves to make more severe
the punishment for the last or· sub- ·
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-21sequent offense which might be
imposed because of the previous
convictions."
Only one punishment or sentence can be
imposed, if any. If this Court finds that
the state carried its burden of proof in showing the prior oonviction then a sentence for
a term of not less than fifteen years is proper. If the Trial Court erred in allowing
into evidence Exhibits 1 and 2, then a term
of not more than five years is correct.
CONCLUSION
Appellant as a matter of law is entitled
to have his Motion granted directing a verdict
in his favor, or in the alternative, the Motion
to Dismiss granted at the close of the State's
case in chief.
No evidence exists to corroborate the testimony of the three accomplices. The statutory
commandof Section 77-31-18 is clear and decisive
of the motion.
In the alternative, it is submitted that

reversible error was committed by refusing to

instruct the jury on the law regarding the
testimony of accomplices. Further reversible
error was committed by the Trial Court's refusal
to instruct on a lesser offense and the
admission of the immaterial, hearsay, but highly
prejudicial evidence of the credit cards under
the guise of impeachment.
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In the alternative, it is submitted that
the state failed to carry its burden of proof
to establish the status of Appellant being an
habitual criminal inasmuch as the Court erred
in admitting into evidence Exhibits 1 and 2.
Appellant can be sentenced to a term of no
more than five years to be served at the Utah
· State· Prison. ·· ·
Respectfully submitted,
NESLEN AND MOCK
,,

By~--------------------J ame s R. Brown
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